Not all political violence has the same implications

January 6 violence is categorically different and a more serious threat than riots.

Recently, Adam Kinzinger discussed the “let’s fight” challenge Senator Markwayne Mullin issued to a witness at a public hearing. Kinzinger says Mullin “indicated that his behavior was not worse than the brutal caning of anti-slavery Representative Charles Sumner of Massachusetts by pro-slavery Representative Preston Brooks of South Carolina.” Kinzinger main point is that despite the degree of political division present today, politicians are saying and do increasingly inflammatory things, because they bring them attention and funding, and this is resulting in an escalation in rhetoric, possibly paving the way towards violent conflict.

In response, Phisto Sobanii correctly notes that the political violence Kinzinger decries was small potatoes compared to the political violence seen during the BLM protests in 2020.  Using the lens of cliodynamics, I noted that Sobanii was making a category error in his comparison. Cliodynamics is the study of historical dynamics, including how and why nations and civilizations rise and fall. Political violence falls into categories posing different threat levels to our society. I explore these ideas in today’s post.

Violence caused by social contagion-promulgated radicalization.
The BLM violence falls into a category of social unrest that arises during a Creedal Passion Period (CPP). CPPs are periodic outbursts of sociopolitical and cultural turmoil that happen every fifty years or so. They flare up for a time and then dissipate on their own. Though they can result in permanent changes to politics and culture, they pose little threat to our society on their own. They can play a dangerous role when they work in concert with another kind of political violence that I discuss later.

CPPs arise as a result of an “outbreak” of radical ideation caused by the dissipation of “herd immunity” protection as those who recovered from previous infection during the last outbreak have passed from the scene. Evolutionary scientist Peter Turchin proposed a social contagion model to explain these cycles of radicalization, which I implemented and presented along with a measure of what I called sociopolitical (SPI) and cultural instability (CI).

Turchin’s approach focused on SPI. He assembled a database of about 1600 SPI events over 1780-2010 and found clear-cut cycles peaking in 1870, 1920 and 1970 and a possible one around 1830. I extended the database further back by adding slave revolts and Revolutionary and Civil War battles as SPI events and updated the database to the present using mass shootings (which makes up the vast majority of SPI today) as a proxy, bringing it up to more than 2500 events from the 17^th century to the present. I found Turchin’s three peaks, except the 1870 peak was moved up to 1865 reflecting the Civil War. I also found peaks in 1740, 1780 and 1840, as well as the 2020 peak Turchin predicted.

Social contagion should also apply to ideas leading to expressions other than SPI, such as religious or philosophic ideas leading to new forms of cultural expression that I call cultural instability (CI). Examples of American CI events would be the start of new religions and Christian denominations, major revivals, publication of religious or moral texts, and religious/moralistic political movements like abolition, social gospel, 1960’s Civil Rights movements, Moral Majority, and social justice movements today. I assembled a database of more than 250 American CI events since the early 17^th century. I obtained most of them from timelines assembled by religious, civil rights, or political scholars, and some from Wikipedia. Analysis found peaks in 1735, 1830, 1970, a broad peak over 1910-30, and one today.

The SPI and CI peaks tend to coincide, as one would expect if they arose from a common cause, so I combined both SPI and CI into a single SPCI measure showing well-defined peaks in 1740, 1780, 1835, 1865, 1920, 1970 and 2020. I fit the social contagion model to the peak spacing in the data by adjusting a single adjustable parameter in the model.

Using the social contagion model output, I identified periods of above and below average levels of radicalization as predicted by the model and calculated the average frequency of SPI and CI in each period. The above average period would be the CPPs, which are the gray rows in Table 1 below. Inspection of the data shows that the values in the gray rows tend to be higher than in the white rows for both CI and SPI events. The variation of the average numbers of SPI events is very great, particularly for the periods covering the Revolutionary and Civil Wars, which obviously were times of extreme violence. Turchin leaves out the Civil War in his analysis, but I felt it is part of our history and so I included it.

Table 1. Average SPI, CI & SPCI during CPP (gray) and intervening periods (white)

For my analysis I took the natural log of the values for both CI and SPI events and performed a t-test on those. For CI events I got geometric average (log-mean) values of 0.88 and 0.46 events per year for CPP and non-CPP, respectively. This difference was significant at the 93% level. For SPI events the corresponding values were 13.2 and 5.1, with a significance of 94%. Since evidence of an effect was found, and the proposed cause (social contagion) affects both in parallel, I calculated the geometric average of the two to give average SPCI for each period and performed the t-test on them. I obtained average values of 3.6 and 1.7 SPCI events per year, which was significant at the 99% level. In my previous article, I presented a graphical version of SPCI and compared it to the model output used to construct the periods in Table 1.

The average length of this cycle is 45 years. Closer inspection shows it has gotten longer over time. It averaged 43 years before 1880 and 50 years since. This shift of 7 years matches well with the increase in the average age of our political leaders. The average age of Representatives has increased by 8 years from 44 before 1880 to 52 after, while average age for governors has increased by 4 and for senators by 6, for an overall average increase of 7 years. Cycle length in the model is determined by T, the span of years during which time a person is politically and culturally relevant (and so plays a role in the process), and P, the time it takes for a person to “recover” from radicalism. I set P equal to the value Turchin used and adjusted T to fit the data. The value used for T before 1880 was seven years shorter than the one used after. The specific values of T depend on P and so are arbitrary, but the difference between the pre- and post-1880 values is always 7 years since this arises from the spacing shown by the data. A rising average age of political actors implies a rising length of political careers, which is consistent with a rising length of T (period of political relevance).

How do we know BLM is CPP-related?
The specific observation Sobanii was making was in reference to SPI in the 2020 BLM demonstrations. The founding of BLM in 2013 is identified as a CI event in the current CPP (2010-28) because it is partially based on radical ideas such as critical race theory (CRT). CRT finds its origins in the analysis of Harvard law professor Derek Bell, who as a civil rights lawyer had been involved in school desegregation cases. One of the objectives of this work was to make available to black students the same good education available to students from all classes at whites-only schools, by integrating black students into these existing schools. When integration was implemented, the middle- and upper-class white students left the public schools for private schools, leaving lower-class whites and blacks in integrated public schools. With children from affluent families no longer attending public school, there was no incentive for their parents to pay taxes for schools they did not use, so they were underfunded. Disappointed by the absence of racial progress in the wake of the Civil Rights movement, Bell developed a Marxian materialist explanation for this involving what would be called white supremacy today. He argued the repeal of Jim Crow happened because it suited white interests; black (and lower-class white) people would continue to be kept down by the fact of white (elite) control of the levers of institutional power. I mentioned this development as part of the evolution of Leftist movements during the previous CPP in last week’s post. Though Marxian in the class struggle etiology of the problem, the blending of race with class, paved the way to a later removal of class in favor of race in social justice discourse.

Figure 1. Black college graduates & Congressional seats adjusted for population size.

CRT did not remain as a materialist theory for long. As elite African Americans gained considerable political and cultural power that they had not previously had (see Figure 1) it became harder to maintain that a materialist white supremacy mechanism was responsible for the lack of African American advancement.  CRT evolved to incorporate postmodern philosophies such as those promulgated by Michael Foucault and Jacques Derrida. Material reality was replaced by lived experience, making oppression applicable to affluent black students at elite colleges (who would be seen as petit bourgeoisie in a Marxian context). This new conception developed into today’s CRT during the 1990’s and 2000’s and has burst out after 2010 in the present CPP and became manifest in the 2020 SPI as noted by Sobanii.

Senator Mullins threat of violence is categorically different from SPI.
Mullins behavior is not motivated by some sort of radical belief system. Rather it reflects a very simple thing. The senator was threatening violence to man he sees as an enemy. It is natural to have violent intentions towards an enemy. The question is why does he see this man he threatened as an enemy, when it is probable the two have never had any personal interactions outside of their jobs? The answer is the two belong to opposing elite factions than are now engaged in Red-Blue cold war, which is an intensification of previous extreme polarization. This progression is illustrated by the rise in the political stress index (PSI) over the last decade (see Figure 2) as discussed in my piece on the American secular cycle. The forces causing rising PSI is explained by Turchin’s structural demographic theory (SDT).

Figure 2. PSI, Radicalization (SPCI) cycles, and political polarization.

PSI is a measure of the forces leading to rising political conflict over time, often ending in civil war, revolution or state collapse. It is preceded by rising political polarization as elites form factions fighting over a fixed number of top positions in society. Turchin compares it to a game of musical chairs. As inequality rises, the concentration of wealth at the upper tiers leads to an increase of ambitious individuals (elite aspirants) seeking high positions. Since the number of such positions is fixed (only one president, 535 Congressmen, 50 governors etc.) rising number of elite aspirants means rising competition and elite factionalization, developing into political conflict, often leading to internal war such as in 1861. PSI-related violence is between elites or elite-led groups of commoners.

Note that Mullin himself compared what he did to one of a series of escalating episodes of Congressional violence in the lead up to civil war: in 1850 a pro-slavery senator pulled a pistol on an anti-slavery senator, the 1856 assault and battery on Charles Sumner, and the 1958 brawl on the floor of the House of Representatives between thirty congressmen divided along South (Red) vs. North (Blue) lines. This violence occurred during a time of sharply rising PSI (see Figure 2) and was explicitly about the slavery issue, the issue that decisively settled by the Civil War, resolving America’s first secular cycle as a nation, which makes the 1950’s Congressional violence obviously related to the secular cycle and not social contagion.

What makes Mullins threat PSI- rather than CPP-related is that it involves a threat of violence by an elite (Senator) made against another elite (Union chief) in opposing factions (Red and Blue, respectively) who are already engaged in high-intensity political conflict.

In pre-modern times, elites were typically landowners trained as military leaders. Competition was based on wealth, and the military power it could buy, and conflict involved warfare or diplomacy backed by military threat. Then, as now, the prize was control of the state.  Figure 2 shows a plot of the social contagion cycles in red and the SPI cycles in black. Red peaks are seen every 45-50 years and represent CPPs. Note the CPPs around 1835 and 1970 occurred at time when PSI was very low. The radical ideas then had little effect on political stability. Though rioting Leftists around 1920 called for revolution, nothing came of it. The 1816-34 CPP birthed the abolitionist movement during a period of low SPI and was seen then as a fringe idea. It went on to place a major role during the 1861-80 CPP with emancipation, citizenship, and suffrage rights for previously enslaved Americans being advanced, enacted, and (for a time) enforced. Most of these were rolled back in the Democratic (Red) South around the end of the 19^th century, with no objections from the Republican (Blue) North, consistent with the low level of PSI at the time. Today we have the same simultaneous rise in radicalization and PSI, as we did in the 1850’s, which has led to fears of a future civil war.

Figure 2 also shows simultaneous rising tends in PSI and radicalization in the 1910’s, just like before the Civil War and today without a subsequent civil war then. What happened? As the CPP was reaching its peak over 1916-1920, economic inequality was falling, which led to declining PSI, reducing the pressure towards civil conflict. I previously described how in an industrialized America, the secular cycle had an economic component that also plays a role, producing something called the capitalist crisis, whose primary effect is financial crises. The capitalist crisis began in 1907, before PSI had risen significantly, so early 20th century elites (who were mostly capitalists) were contending with an economic rather than a political crisis. When the CPP brought America into what Marxists call a revolutionary situation, the Democratic Wilson administration shut that down with the Palmer Raids and deportation of immigrant radicals, and when Republicans returned to power they finished with severe restrictions on immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe. from where many of the leftist radicals had come.

The 1920’s developed into a time of prosperity and optimism and political polarization began to fall (see Figure 2). But the underlying forces toward higher inequality reasserted themselves and PSI again began to rise. Radicalization was crashing by the end of the decade, so there was little potential for a revolutionary situation when the economic collapsed in the 1929-32 financial and economic collapse. The Depression was so unexpected and novel that the Republican leaders had no idea on how to deal with it and essentially abdicated, resulting in a stunning electoral defeat in the 1932 and subsequent losses, establishing a Democratic dispensation. How the new Democratic administration dealt with the Depression in such a way as to restore prosperity and a falling PSI for more than half a century is described here and here. There is still hope civil war can be avoided this time too. I have speculated on some ways this might happen, but I am not satisfied with any of my efforts.

Are SPI and PSI-generated unrest versions of the same thing?
Jonathan Haidt and Greg Lukianoff have taken a look at radical ideas and polarization. They appear to see these two things as part of the same causal process, so their article can provide a challenge to my thesis that they are different things.

They begin with their previous observation of the emergence of set of destructive and illiberal ideas on American college campuses in the years 2014-2016. This is what I see as a manifestation the current CPP illustrated by the red line in Figure 2 and predicted by Professor Turchin in 2012. They note “the polarization spiral between the left and the right has only gotten more intense in the last three years,” and posit that the polarization spiral is driven by two groups. One of these are the Devoted Conservatives, who see themselves as “the last defenders of traditional values that are under threat from the far left” and who were “clearly overrepresented in the attack on the US Capitol in January 2021.” The other is the Progressive Activists, who are “highly sensitive to issues of fairness and equity, particularly with regards to race, gender and other minority group identities” and who are “clearly overrepresented in campus protests and in mass marches for progressive causes.”

They observe:

It may not surprise you to learn that the Devoted Conservatives were the whitest of all seven groups (88% white), but would you have expected that the Progressive Activists were the second whitest (80%)? Likewise, it may not surprise you to learn that the Progressive Activists—who were the most highly educated—reported the highest annual income, but would you have guessed that the second wealthiest group was the Devoted Conservatives?

The two factions battling it out with each other are the richest and whitest of all Americans, that is, they the Red and Blue elite factions whose behavior is affected by PSI. They then describe the characteristics of Blue behavior using Matt Yglesias’s term the “Great Awokening”, which is a comparison between now and the Great Awakening, a term referring to the 1726-44 CPP (note that CI events during the Great Awakening and today in Table 1 were much higher those of the adjacent periods). That is, they relate the activism on the Left today to CI during a previous CPP, putting it into the social contagion category.

They then shift to the Right, which they characterize as “Monomania and Trumpism.” They see two threads. One is a reflexive, overzealous defense of Trump and the other is “anything to own the libs.” That is, the role of the Right (Red Team) is to defend their (flawed) leader and to attack Blue Team’s main forces (Democratic party) and their auxiliaries (Progressive Activists). This is precisely the sort of political war that is driven by PSI.

BLM and the January 6 violence are analogous to different kinds of historical events. The first is a generated through a radical ideology that may well disappear from American society over the next decade as did the Hare Krishnas and Symbionese Liberation Army after the last CPP. The former falls into the same category as the violence between the supporters of Harold Godwinson and Duke William at Hastings in 1066. The issue at hand then was who had the better claim, William, the old king’s first cousin (once removed), or his brother-in-law Harold? William was of royal blood (but was illegitimate). Harold had no legitimate claim but was the choice of the Witan. The issue in 2021 was who had a better claim to be president, the winner of the presidential election, or the guy currently holding the job? In 1066 there was no body of established law, no courts, so the issue was settled on the field of battle. In 2021 the issue did go to the courts and the election winner became president. In 1066, Harold was killed in battle and the Witan was abolished. In 2021, what happens to the loser will also be settled by the courts.