The problem with American foreign policy

The idea of a coherent national interest doesn't really apply to democracies

This Substack employs complicated ideas drawn from multiple social science disciplines. These ideas are laid out in my book America in Crisis. I cover some of the material from the book here plus new insights as they occur to me. For easier comprehension it may help to read past posts that are linked in the current piece in order to gain a better grasp on the tools being employed.

Students of foreign policy often refer to national interests. Here I suggest that the reason the concept of national interest exists is because at the beginning of the modern European states system in the 17^th century, a large majority of the states were ruled by monarchs, whose personal foreign policy interests defined the state interest. We can still see this today in autocracies like Russia, where state policy is an expression of Vladimir Putin’s will. Foreign policy professionals learn their trade through the study and interpretation of history. The study of international relations began using the history of this early period in which national interest was indeed a definable thing inferred from the policy choices and statements of autocrats and the diplomats who represented them. The advisors to subsequent national leaders were themselves educated in foreign policy using a framework in which states had interests like people do that informed diplomat thinking and state policy.

The idea that coherent national interests existed became increasingly out of step with reality as parliamentary monarchies or republics replaced autocracies. For long-time members of the international system, traditional thinking kept the impact of rising democracy fairly small; the foreign policy of countries continued to act as if there was still some definable national interest. The disconnect between a coherent national interest and the disparate interests of members of the governing class became apparent when the US decided it was time to play a great power role in international policies at the beginning of the 20^th century. America was already a democratic republic by this time, with a government reflecting the interests of hundreds of people, who could probably not agree on what to have for lunch much less anything important. Since the US was invulnerable from external threat and so paid little price for mistakes, it did not matter how poorly they managed things. America charged ahead into the Great Game of international diplomacy.

The first leading role the US played in big-time international relations was WW I. The war had arisen as a result of diplomatic game playing between European great powers, Britian, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire. The heir to the Austrian throne was assassinated by a Serbian student, leading Austria-Hungary to declare war on Serbia. The Russian czar, acting as protector of Slavs, declared war on Austria-Hungary. Germany had an alliance with Austria-Hungary and Britain and France were allied with Russia, so they all were obliged to go to war. The Ottoman Empire also chose to go to war on the German side. Four of the six belligerent nations were autocracies and so were operating as an extension of the leader. The other two (Britian and France) were honoring treaties that their foreign policy establishment has deemed necessary. Since France had been overrun by Germany in the 1870 Franco-German War, alliance against Germany made obvious sense. As for Britain, their experience with Napoleon likely made them leery of allowing another country try to seize control of the continent. In short, the decisions of all belligerents were consistent with those of an individual decision maker might make.

Enter the US. She had expressed a desire to remain neutral and declared war in April 1917. The war ended 18 months later. After the war America sought to play a Great Power role in Europe, then decided it had really wanted to have remained neutral after all. To a (temporally) distant observer it might seem that America was deranged. Of course, that is not what happened. “America” did choose anything. The war was a project undertaken by a Democratic administration which was not supported by Republicans. When the latter took power, they had little interest in continuing to pursue a Democratic project. America’s behavior was rational when you consider domestic politics.  The reason why it might seem jarring to foreign policy observers is because for centuries foreign policy had been pursued on the basis that nations have interests in the same way individuals do, and so don’t keep shifting policy for no reason. But the US had never been an autocracy and did not have any tradition of national interest separate from the interests of the political factions within the country.

Things changed with WW II. The Democratic party, who had prosecuted WW I, was again in charge. This time, democrats had come to power in 1933 in response to an economic crisis. Their response to it had given them a tremendous victory in the 1934 Congressional elections, which established a Democratic political order, and gave a third term to President Roosevelt in 1940. This meant that when the US went to war in 1941 the Democrats were firmly in control. Franklin Roosevelt, now in his ninth year as president had a seasoned administration and the authority to call forth the immense powers of American capitalism to reign destruction upon Axis Powers. The policy adroitness of the New Dealers was further demonstrated by how they prevented the economic disaster of the post-WW I era from happening again. In WW I, war spending increased the NAIRU (the unemployment level below which inflation rises) to 9%, while the war effort required a low unemployment rate, far below NAIRU, which necessarily resulted in very high inflation. The high inflation meant a return to Republican rule. Furthermore, the Fed response to the high inflation sent the economy into deep recession. Both of these meant erosions of gains made by Labor during the Wilson administration. The New Dealers wanted to avoid this and did so using wage and price controls followed by a rapid shift from high deficits to budget surplus after the war ended. Inflation was subdued under price controls. When they were lifted, a brief period high inflation ensued, which was soon suppressed by the sharp deficit reduction. The brief inflation gave Republicans control of Congress, which they lost in the next election when price stability was restored. There was no postwar depression, the wage gains workers had made during the New Deal were retained and the postwar era of widely shared prosperity had begun.

This time, the wartime Democratic administration did not fall after the war and so was able to establish the international role for America that Wilson had been unable to achieve. Having established a new political order, the first Republican president would be of the preemptive archetype that is supportive of the other party’s political order (think of how Bill Clinton felt it necessary to implement a number of Republican-style policies because of the Reagan political order.) Not only that, but Dwight Eisenhower was one of the architects of the Allied victory and was supportive of the Democratic vision of an American-led postwar order. What this meant was that the idea that America should play a leadership role, expressed by President Wilson was cast in concrete by successive administrations over 1933 though 1968 who bought into this.

Furthermore, President Eisenhower oversaw a massive expansion of peacetime military spending that led to the creation of what he called a “military-industrial complex” (MIC). The MIC consumed the majority of a much-enlarged government spending, which mostly went to Republican special interests. This created a new constituency for Republicans, and an identity for them as an anti-communist, hawkish conservative party. This was a departure for Republican conservatives, whose leading lights such as “Mr. Conservative” Senator Robert A. Taft had been chary of American involvement in foreign affairs. The militaristic stances of subsequent conservative leaders such as Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan show conservative Republicans had embraced an enhanced American role in international affairs. Thus, even when Republicans came to power over 1969-76 and 1981-92, they remained on-board with the foreign policy the New Dealers enacted.

These developments created a unity between Democrats and Republicans in favor of an active leadership role for the US in international affairs that acted much like the interest of an American monarch looking to construct a new kind of empire. That is, over some sixty years (1933-1992) the American government was led by “Wilsonian” presidents who enacted policy consistent with the idea of a definable American interest to be “Leader of the Free World.” It was over this time that the modern American foreign policy establishment developed. The presidents of this period were men who had played a role, senior or junior, in WW II.

Bill Clinton was the first president from a post-war generation. His formative experience with respect to foreign policy was Vietnam, not WW II. Vietnam was an utter disaster for the Democratic party. Slavish adherence to the American role as world leader led 1960’s Democrats to abandon the structures that maintained the postwar prosperity that benefited their working-class base and led to the end of the Democratic political order created by the New Deal. Furthermore, the Vietnam war required that young men be drafted to fight and die in an unnecessary war which created an anti-war youth culture. In response to a sense that Vietnam was a mistake, Democrats ran anti-war Sen. George McGovern as their candidate in 1972, who called for dramatic reductions in US defense spending, making him sort of a Robert Taft of the Left. He was defeated in one of the largest landslides in history.  

Clinton had avoided service during the Vietnam War, had been tangentially involved in the antiwar movement and had worked on the McGovern campaign. He was the first president who did not have a default positive attitude towards application of US military power resulting from the American experience in WW II. He ran against a WW II combat veteran and won. Third party candidate Ross Perot had attacked the Bush administration for high budget deficits, which he blamed for poor economic performance since the end of the inflationary 70’s (real wages for men had not risen over the previous 12 years of Republican rule). It is possible that Perot’s run helped Clinton win. It was my distinct sense during the campaign that Perot attacked Bush (as the author of the budget deficits Perot assailed) harder than Clinton. Clinton acted to fix the fiscal irresponsibility of the Reagan-Bush era by pursuing tax increases and spending cuts (mostly miliary). He brought both the deficit and interest rates down, enabling full employment and modest wage increases. His focus was on domestic rather than foreign policy. His administration represents an initial break with the idea of American leadership. He was less ready and willing to employ military power as his predecessor and successor were.

The next president saw the 911 attack early in his administration and responded with two wars of choice which ended in failure, souring Republicans on the use of American military power, With the rise of Donald Trump an isolationist strain has reappeared in the Republican party after a 75-year hiatus. The US has returned to what I argue is the baseline position of a democratic republic largely invulnerable to direct attack: the “national interest” is simply the interests of its political elites aggregated into the two major parties. The lack of a coherent interest that extends beyond a single administration means the US cannot express any sort of coherent foreign policy views or actions, nor can it serve as a reliable partner for other countries in situations in which differences of opinion exist between the parties.

The Ukraine war is an illustration of the consequences of this new reality.  In the absence of Western support, I think it is safe to say that the Ukrainian armed forces would have been defeated by now, though guerilla actions would likely continue. Russia is an autocracy and so it has a coherent national interest defined by Vladimir Putin’s calculated self-interest. The war seems to be stalemated, yet Putin seems content to pour increasing resources into the conflict. Apparently, he believes at some point the Americans will throw in the towel after which he will win. Already there are numerous voices on the American Right who wish to do just that. For example, just recently, the Republican Speaker collaborated with Democrats to pass a short-term funding bill to avoid a government shutdown with the stipulation that aid be denied to Ukraine.

If my thesis is correct and we have returned to the situation of a century ago, then the US cannot pursue any sort of coherent foreign policy unless a new political order is established by a new Reconstructive president as happened in 1932. Otherwise, it does not make sense for the US to maintain its global military presence as nothing can be achieved with a deranged foreign policy resulting from national interest swaying with fickle domestic politics. It might be possible to achieve a peace in Ukraine on terms favorable to Ukraine (restoration of all territory and 5-year moratorium on Russian westward aggression) and Russia (US withdrawal from Europe over 5 years) which would allow Europe to reconfigure for its own defense and reduce America’s footprint in the world. Withdrawing from both Europe and the Middle East would reduce the opportunities for America to make tragic blunders as we have done my whole life with Vietnam, Gulf War (led to 911), Afghanistan and Iraq.