This post is well-done, intelligent, and informative and I appreciate how it dives into the complex interplay between different elite groups in American history and how their influence on the country's political and economic topography as evolved over time. I found the designations "Mandarins" or Blue elites and the Red elites useful, and the tracing of their trends over several secular cycles insightful.
But, the characterization of the pre-New Deal era (and the nature, composition, roles, and extent of influence of the "Reds" and the "Blues") should be significantly adjusted from further consideration of the decentralized nature of governance during the Old Republic. The article appears to focus on broad national trends and elite behaviors without fully considering how the decentralization of political and economic power allowed for a significant variety of local and state-level policy activities, including antitrust activities and other policies, often done at the city level, that people typically associate with federal power today. Also, the political landscape of that time was shaped by mass-member political parties, which played a crucial role in governance and policy implementation at all levels, as opposed to the centralized and managed nature of today's political parties. This localized and variegated approach to governance during the Old Republic could have influenced the formation and influence of elite groups differently than the analysis posits, affecting the direct comparison to today's centralized dynamics.
I don't understand what you are taling about. Anti-trust at the local level, or even the state level? How would this even this work? Can you give some examples of this?
And where do you get the idea that the political parties were mass-member parties in the past? Until fairly recently entire categories American adults were excluded from suffrage. Party bosses used to select candidates. Before 1916 US senators were selected by state legislature, many members of which were explicit representatives of important businesses or other private interests in the state, an American equivalent of rotten boroughs. It was openly acknowledged that this was happening, but it took a long time for a corrective (17th Amendment) to be applied.
I would also note that for all the talk about federalism and the variety its offers, all but one state chose to duplicate the Federal structure of a bicameral legislature. As for local policy I would note that state government in Florida is currently riding roughshod over local ordinances concerning minimum wages and work rules for outdoor workers, indicating that variegated local governance is still present today. Another important area of variegated governance at the state level is in environment regulation. My wife and I both worked at a Pfizer plant in Michigan. She worked in Environmental, and I was involved in some environmental projected early in my career. The was no mention of the EPA as a regulatory body, we dealt exclusively with the Michigan regulator. This is a common issue for businesses. They have to deal with multiple sets of state regulatory bodies for all sorts of things from insurance and banking to environmental affairs.
Hi Mike, thanks for the reply. Lets break your response into elements and responsd peiece by peice:
Antitrust at Local and State Levels: While antitrust enforcement is typically seen today in its federal manifestation, notably the Sherman Act of 1890, antitrust measures have a far deeper and more decentralized history at the state and local levels. Early examples of such regs can be traced back to colonial times and the early republic, where various states and municipalities enacted laws to combat the undue influence and monopolistic practices. Example: in the late 18th century, state legislatures took actions against monopolistic practices in industries like flour milling and tobacco processing. Fore examples, the Commonwealth of Virginia in the 1790s, enacted legislation targeting the tobacco inspection industry, which had become controlled by a few powerful people. This legislation broke up their the control, leading to fairer prices and better quality control. Ccities also did antitrust. Example: in the early 1800s, many city governments issued ordinances to regulate and limit the market control exerted by certain merchants and traders over essential goods such as food and coal. These local ordinances prevented price gouging and ensured that monopolistic practices did not harm locals. In the mid-19th century, various states began implementing their own laws to curb the powers of monopolies and trusts, particularly those affecting the state's economic interests directly. For instance, Ohio passed legislation in 1884 aimed at regulating railroad and telegraph companies to prevent anti-competitive practices that could harm local businesses and consumers. Similarly, California and Texas enacted their own antitrust laws in the late 19th century to tackle monopolies within their borders, such as railroad and oil companies, before the federal government took a significant role in antitrust enforcement.
These early actions underline the proactive stance that states took against monopolistic enterprises affecting their economies. This state-level initiative demonstrates a significant aspect of the decentralized governance characteristic of the Old Republic era, where local and state governments exercised considerable autonomy to regulate commerce and protect public interests. The role of state courts and legislatures in addressing these issues was big, demonstrating a level of engagement and intervention that is now overshadowed by the focus on fed level antitrust. he national level.
Mass-Member Political Parties: The characterization of political parties as being exclusive and centrally controlled due to restricted suffrage and party boss systems simplifies the historical reality. While it is accurate that suffrage was more limited than today, and that party bosses played significant roles in candidate selections, this does not negate the fact that political parties operated with massive grassroots organizations. These parties were indeed mass-member compared to today's standards where party interaction is more about media engagement than physical membership. The Democratic and Republican parties had extensive local clubs and organizations that involved a significant portion of the (voting) population in activities, rallies, and local meetings.
Had the trajectory of expanding political participation continued uninterrupted, we might envision a present-day scenario with near-universal engagement in the political process. It's worth considering that if the contemporary political system, which relies heavily on media and less on direct grassroots involvement, had been transplanted back to the 19th century, it would likely have mirrored the exclusivity of its era, potentially sidelining even larger segments of the population. The historical mass-member nature of parties, featuring extensive local clubs and organizations, actively involved a growing proportion of the population in civic activities, rallies, and local meetings. This expansion was pivotal not only for mobilization and visibility but also for fostering a sense of direct involvement in democratic governance. The historical progression there shows the how inclusivity level of the old political system was expanding and inspires us to the potential for a more engaged democratic process today.
Selection of Senators and Rotten Boroughs Comparison: While U.S. Senators were elected by state legislatures until 1913, the comparison to rotten boroughs is a big stretch. Rotten boroughs were constituencies that had decayed to the point of having very few voters who were easily controlled. In the U.S., although senators were selected by state legislatures, the legislatures were themselves elected bodies, even though being imperfect. This system was indeed criticized for being prone to corruption and undue influence from economic elites, butt the mere fact that it was changed DURING the Old Republic supports my point that the OR was improving over times. Also, it brings us right back to the point that most all fiscal and economic policy was handled at the sub-federal level thus making the Senate not anywhere near as important as it is today.
The second paragraph: These modern examples cant fully be used to draw direct comparisons with the governance and decentralized nature of America's Old Republic. Today's political and reg environment operates under a greatly different framework, where both the scale and the scope of federal and state powers have changed immensly. This new system, which has distinct forms, designs, and characteristics, makes direct comparisons to the OR not very relevant, as the foundational principles and operational dynamics have shifted fundamentally from those of the Old Republic era.
Thanks for the examples Mike. I grant all your anti-trust examples. All I will note is as business get bigger, it is harder to regulate by a small-scale polity and that probably explains why it moved from local/state to national level.
.Mass-Member Political Parties: These parties were indeed mass-member compared to today's standards where party interaction is more about media engagement than physical membership. The Democratic and Republican parties had extensive local clubs and organizations that involved a significant portion of the (voting) population in activities, rallies, and local meetings.
I see that. I think this is part of the decline in American participation in all kind of social groups as documented in Bowling Alone. As for why this is happening, I don’t know, but then I have to note that I am not involved in any social club or group. Maybe politics was a form of recreation that has become less popular over time as the number of recreational options has exploded. Hell movie attendance is down, people would rather watch at home, and folks would rather argue online than get personally involved in politics.
I don’t see what you call the Old Republic is relevant to what I wrote about wrt to elite categorization or the Beveridge curve analysis. I actually favor a three republic scheme:
Hi, Mike. I may have miswritten in earlier replies; I found your writing intelligent and informative (I didn't even know what the Beveridge curve was until I read the post). I don't disagree per se; my point is just that these are two completely different paradigms in a true sense; they are entirely different modes of governance so a final analysis of anything that compares them may need to be weary about the produced details. I recently deep rabbit holed and discovered things I never knew. When I previously learned about the end of member parties, every reason I could find was that comms tech (radio, TV) made them not needed. But I decided to look to see if anything else happened and sure enough, there was: they passed anti-corruption laws that had the effect of neutering the local chapters as fundraisers while different new laws created the modern PAC; this just shifted corruption to new vectors but in a way that began a process of degrading the local parties which had already been greatly degraded due to so much econ and fiscal policy having been taken away from cities and states. The fuel for mass participation must be fuel that generates participation at the local level because it's just rare to have enough national issues to get enough of a local population perpetually involved. And I think (think, don't know) that the huge drop in participation is from this, I've heard this many, many times in my life: "it doesn't matter," and the fact is that's mostly right. Every four years we essentially have a single headline election that can satisfy most all people because most governance is nationwide single policy that can't satisfy all areas. When people can actually engage in governance in their local areas they have something to participate in. RE: antitrust today, I've learned a lot more about China recently and was very surprised, (Xi may be trying to change this, hopefully he fails) 2/3 of gov spending and revenue collection (the latter is important as it makes it THEIR money) happens at the local level, the next highest is provincial, national is last. Their local governments have massive leeway in implementation of policy directives allowing for huge variation to meet local needs and desires. They often break the national law and engage in forms of local trade protectionism. And THEY DO ANTITRUST at the local level in 2024. Their local parties, and I don't want to overstate this, are much more representative than one might think; they draw from a wide spectrum of occupations (over half don’t have degrees) and people within them really do get to affect policy. In many ways it's a matter of degrees, we're (IMO) way too centralized, states and localities need the ability to engage in much more econ and fiscal policy than they do and the people within them need far more access to affect policy, late 1980s to today's China is not one story, like or America's it has these common themes and unified big stuff that makes it appear that way but it's actually many different stories with really, really different details, and these individual stories by and large weren’t planned, instead they were just emergent. I've met many people in my life that want to engage in politics and government in their area but simply can't; if they could, we'd see different policy choices and outcomes, for good and ill but I strongly suspect that over the long run much better. Also, more democratic governance structures can greatly lessen the hold that special interest groups have over all big areas of our system, from science to industry to finance to you name it. But this all just personal opinion and don't pretend to know that I'm right. I really do enjoy your writing; have a great Sunday night.
My take on history is as an evolutionary process. I look at how different kinds of data change over time. When I find a change, then I look into the narrative history of what was happening then to see if I can find some reason for the change.
A different approach is to focus on the narrative history of what happened when and where. Your focus on participation has given rise to your concept of the Old Republic.
For me unless these things are associated with changes in the data series that I use to track historical evolution I find it hard to see a significant role they played.
You and Mike both have great points here, but let's look at an example here which is highly illustrative of how data can hint at 2nd and 3rd order effects, linking the invisible cultural effects with data-driven causes.
I'm sure you're aware that back in 2000s a threshold was reached where employment from large companies in the private sector began to exceed that of the SME sector. This was a disastrous development for one simple reason- people who work for larger employers, be they government or private, tend to be fundamentally less happy and fulfilled, although in individual cases this won't always be the case. To put in context, a 2018 survey of the UK SME sector showed that just shy of 80% of employees stating that they were either 'very' or 'extremely' happy with their employment and workplace. Compare this to government or corporations and I doubt one could find a third of employees who are somewhat happy with their employment.
There are plenty of reasons why this happens. A gardener may get paid exactly the same as an Amazon worker, once he's paid for his utility vehicle, petrol and insurance, but he gets a huge amount more satisfaction from his work, and usually gets thanked on a regular basis from customers grateful for his hard work (apart from the snobs who won't make him a cup of tea or coffee). Another reason is the intercession of HR bureaucracies between bosses and employees, impeding the normal reciprocal relationships between worker and management.
I'm pretty sure your employment was somewhat different. Specialists tend to get a better deal through KETA management, more prone to receiving kisses than kicks. I had the same deal with Anglian- access to director level decision makers, and the chance to present my ideas for innovation and change. But most workers at large companies don't fall into these categories. They lead depressing work lives which allow them little input, or feelings of autonomy- some responsibility, but very little in the way of authority to make changes or act on their own initiative.
And, of course, this shows up in other data as 2nd and 3rd order effects. I'm sure you're aware of Angus Deaton's highly relevant work 'Deaths of Despair and the Future of Capitalism'. I am not claiming that the shift from small to large employers is the only factor, but it is a major factor, probably only eclipsed by the critical effects of a drop out of labour participation, which is the tail end of the curve to the broader phenomenon of workplace disenfranchisement.
And the addition of DEI bureaucracies on top of HR has only made the situation worse. In one survey conducted for the Free Speech Union by Dynata, it was found that 31% of people had left a former employer because of the uncomfortable workplaces created by DEI training and bureaucracy. If you happened to be Black or LGBT in the UK at the time the survey was taken, the figure rose to a whopping 43%, begging the question who exactly is this essentially political bureaucracy supposed to serve?
My point would be this- sometimes cause and effect are obvious in the data. Sometimes the effects only show up with time, particularly when a more extreme version of an existing cause makes an appearance- like the difference between HR departments and their worse counterpart, DEI.
Overall, the shift from small to big is societally disastrous.
And that is fair enough!. Tracking changes in data series to to get a grip on historical evolution is a valid way to approach the questions. But this approach *MAY* have some inherent limitations, especially when dealing with large long-term paradigm shifts that typically always take time to fully manifest themselves in data sets.
One problems here is lag time in historical data to reflect the changes in realities. For example, large scale and inherent political and/or economic changes, like those seen in the transition from the Old Republic's decentralized governance to today's more centralized system, might not show immediate effects in the series. There might be a sort of "phase space" (colloquial def of the term) where data lags or for some period of time just fails to capture the immediate impacts of the paradigm shift. Also, the choice of data series itself could skew your perceptions if it's not tracking closely with the variables most affected by the changes.
Connecting data changes to narrative history is important. But maybe it shoulf take into consideration that some effects, especially those related to structural and systemic changes like large and deep shifts in political governance or economic policy frameworks, typically manifest only over long periods of time. These effects might have a lot nuanced and require a wider array of data or longer time horizons to be fully appreciated.
Something things, like the emergence of private sector central planning in the economy, which fully began to emerge in the late 1970s as the private sector components of that began to have their public sector counterparts dissolved and then absorbed their functions, can be difficult to see in headline data. But their effects on everything from real incomes to size and quality of output across scientific fields are (I beleieve) quite real. And this problem has gotten worse over time and, I assume, so have its effects. Here's a great book from all the way back in 1985 that identified the problem that had already emerged: "The Transformation of American Capitalism: From Competitive Market Structures to Centralized Private Sector Planning" by John R. Munkirs
At least that my point of view, for whatever thats worth.
This post is well-done, intelligent, and informative and I appreciate how it dives into the complex interplay between different elite groups in American history and how their influence on the country's political and economic topography as evolved over time. I found the designations "Mandarins" or Blue elites and the Red elites useful, and the tracing of their trends over several secular cycles insightful.
But, the characterization of the pre-New Deal era (and the nature, composition, roles, and extent of influence of the "Reds" and the "Blues") should be significantly adjusted from further consideration of the decentralized nature of governance during the Old Republic. The article appears to focus on broad national trends and elite behaviors without fully considering how the decentralization of political and economic power allowed for a significant variety of local and state-level policy activities, including antitrust activities and other policies, often done at the city level, that people typically associate with federal power today. Also, the political landscape of that time was shaped by mass-member political parties, which played a crucial role in governance and policy implementation at all levels, as opposed to the centralized and managed nature of today's political parties. This localized and variegated approach to governance during the Old Republic could have influenced the formation and influence of elite groups differently than the analysis posits, affecting the direct comparison to today's centralized dynamics.
I don't understand what you are taling about. Anti-trust at the local level, or even the state level? How would this even this work? Can you give some examples of this?
And where do you get the idea that the political parties were mass-member parties in the past? Until fairly recently entire categories American adults were excluded from suffrage. Party bosses used to select candidates. Before 1916 US senators were selected by state legislature, many members of which were explicit representatives of important businesses or other private interests in the state, an American equivalent of rotten boroughs. It was openly acknowledged that this was happening, but it took a long time for a corrective (17th Amendment) to be applied.
I would also note that for all the talk about federalism and the variety its offers, all but one state chose to duplicate the Federal structure of a bicameral legislature. As for local policy I would note that state government in Florida is currently riding roughshod over local ordinances concerning minimum wages and work rules for outdoor workers, indicating that variegated local governance is still present today. Another important area of variegated governance at the state level is in environment regulation. My wife and I both worked at a Pfizer plant in Michigan. She worked in Environmental, and I was involved in some environmental projected early in my career. The was no mention of the EPA as a regulatory body, we dealt exclusively with the Michigan regulator. This is a common issue for businesses. They have to deal with multiple sets of state regulatory bodies for all sorts of things from insurance and banking to environmental affairs.
Hi Mike, thanks for the reply. Lets break your response into elements and responsd peiece by peice:
Antitrust at Local and State Levels: While antitrust enforcement is typically seen today in its federal manifestation, notably the Sherman Act of 1890, antitrust measures have a far deeper and more decentralized history at the state and local levels. Early examples of such regs can be traced back to colonial times and the early republic, where various states and municipalities enacted laws to combat the undue influence and monopolistic practices. Example: in the late 18th century, state legislatures took actions against monopolistic practices in industries like flour milling and tobacco processing. Fore examples, the Commonwealth of Virginia in the 1790s, enacted legislation targeting the tobacco inspection industry, which had become controlled by a few powerful people. This legislation broke up their the control, leading to fairer prices and better quality control. Ccities also did antitrust. Example: in the early 1800s, many city governments issued ordinances to regulate and limit the market control exerted by certain merchants and traders over essential goods such as food and coal. These local ordinances prevented price gouging and ensured that monopolistic practices did not harm locals. In the mid-19th century, various states began implementing their own laws to curb the powers of monopolies and trusts, particularly those affecting the state's economic interests directly. For instance, Ohio passed legislation in 1884 aimed at regulating railroad and telegraph companies to prevent anti-competitive practices that could harm local businesses and consumers. Similarly, California and Texas enacted their own antitrust laws in the late 19th century to tackle monopolies within their borders, such as railroad and oil companies, before the federal government took a significant role in antitrust enforcement.
These early actions underline the proactive stance that states took against monopolistic enterprises affecting their economies. This state-level initiative demonstrates a significant aspect of the decentralized governance characteristic of the Old Republic era, where local and state governments exercised considerable autonomy to regulate commerce and protect public interests. The role of state courts and legislatures in addressing these issues was big, demonstrating a level of engagement and intervention that is now overshadowed by the focus on fed level antitrust. he national level.
Mass-Member Political Parties: The characterization of political parties as being exclusive and centrally controlled due to restricted suffrage and party boss systems simplifies the historical reality. While it is accurate that suffrage was more limited than today, and that party bosses played significant roles in candidate selections, this does not negate the fact that political parties operated with massive grassroots organizations. These parties were indeed mass-member compared to today's standards where party interaction is more about media engagement than physical membership. The Democratic and Republican parties had extensive local clubs and organizations that involved a significant portion of the (voting) population in activities, rallies, and local meetings.
Had the trajectory of expanding political participation continued uninterrupted, we might envision a present-day scenario with near-universal engagement in the political process. It's worth considering that if the contemporary political system, which relies heavily on media and less on direct grassroots involvement, had been transplanted back to the 19th century, it would likely have mirrored the exclusivity of its era, potentially sidelining even larger segments of the population. The historical mass-member nature of parties, featuring extensive local clubs and organizations, actively involved a growing proportion of the population in civic activities, rallies, and local meetings. This expansion was pivotal not only for mobilization and visibility but also for fostering a sense of direct involvement in democratic governance. The historical progression there shows the how inclusivity level of the old political system was expanding and inspires us to the potential for a more engaged democratic process today.
Selection of Senators and Rotten Boroughs Comparison: While U.S. Senators were elected by state legislatures until 1913, the comparison to rotten boroughs is a big stretch. Rotten boroughs were constituencies that had decayed to the point of having very few voters who were easily controlled. In the U.S., although senators were selected by state legislatures, the legislatures were themselves elected bodies, even though being imperfect. This system was indeed criticized for being prone to corruption and undue influence from economic elites, butt the mere fact that it was changed DURING the Old Republic supports my point that the OR was improving over times. Also, it brings us right back to the point that most all fiscal and economic policy was handled at the sub-federal level thus making the Senate not anywhere near as important as it is today.
The second paragraph: These modern examples cant fully be used to draw direct comparisons with the governance and decentralized nature of America's Old Republic. Today's political and reg environment operates under a greatly different framework, where both the scale and the scope of federal and state powers have changed immensly. This new system, which has distinct forms, designs, and characteristics, makes direct comparisons to the OR not very relevant, as the foundational principles and operational dynamics have shifted fundamentally from those of the Old Republic era.
I hope youve been having a nice weekend.
---Mike
Thanks for the examples Mike. I grant all your anti-trust examples. All I will note is as business get bigger, it is harder to regulate by a small-scale polity and that probably explains why it moved from local/state to national level.
.Mass-Member Political Parties: These parties were indeed mass-member compared to today's standards where party interaction is more about media engagement than physical membership. The Democratic and Republican parties had extensive local clubs and organizations that involved a significant portion of the (voting) population in activities, rallies, and local meetings.
I see that. I think this is part of the decline in American participation in all kind of social groups as documented in Bowling Alone. As for why this is happening, I don’t know, but then I have to note that I am not involved in any social club or group. Maybe politics was a form of recreation that has become less popular over time as the number of recreational options has exploded. Hell movie attendance is down, people would rather watch at home, and folks would rather argue online than get personally involved in politics.
I don’t see what you call the Old Republic is relevant to what I wrote about wrt to elite categorization or the Beveridge curve analysis. I actually favor a three republic scheme:
https://thenomocracyproject.wordpress.com/2013/12/13/the-united-states-as-three-republics-an-unorthodox-constitutional-history/
But for me, republics simply serve as a justification for my three secular cycle scheme over Turchin’s two cycle scheme.
Hi, Mike. I may have miswritten in earlier replies; I found your writing intelligent and informative (I didn't even know what the Beveridge curve was until I read the post). I don't disagree per se; my point is just that these are two completely different paradigms in a true sense; they are entirely different modes of governance so a final analysis of anything that compares them may need to be weary about the produced details. I recently deep rabbit holed and discovered things I never knew. When I previously learned about the end of member parties, every reason I could find was that comms tech (radio, TV) made them not needed. But I decided to look to see if anything else happened and sure enough, there was: they passed anti-corruption laws that had the effect of neutering the local chapters as fundraisers while different new laws created the modern PAC; this just shifted corruption to new vectors but in a way that began a process of degrading the local parties which had already been greatly degraded due to so much econ and fiscal policy having been taken away from cities and states. The fuel for mass participation must be fuel that generates participation at the local level because it's just rare to have enough national issues to get enough of a local population perpetually involved. And I think (think, don't know) that the huge drop in participation is from this, I've heard this many, many times in my life: "it doesn't matter," and the fact is that's mostly right. Every four years we essentially have a single headline election that can satisfy most all people because most governance is nationwide single policy that can't satisfy all areas. When people can actually engage in governance in their local areas they have something to participate in. RE: antitrust today, I've learned a lot more about China recently and was very surprised, (Xi may be trying to change this, hopefully he fails) 2/3 of gov spending and revenue collection (the latter is important as it makes it THEIR money) happens at the local level, the next highest is provincial, national is last. Their local governments have massive leeway in implementation of policy directives allowing for huge variation to meet local needs and desires. They often break the national law and engage in forms of local trade protectionism. And THEY DO ANTITRUST at the local level in 2024. Their local parties, and I don't want to overstate this, are much more representative than one might think; they draw from a wide spectrum of occupations (over half don’t have degrees) and people within them really do get to affect policy. In many ways it's a matter of degrees, we're (IMO) way too centralized, states and localities need the ability to engage in much more econ and fiscal policy than they do and the people within them need far more access to affect policy, late 1980s to today's China is not one story, like or America's it has these common themes and unified big stuff that makes it appear that way but it's actually many different stories with really, really different details, and these individual stories by and large weren’t planned, instead they were just emergent. I've met many people in my life that want to engage in politics and government in their area but simply can't; if they could, we'd see different policy choices and outcomes, for good and ill but I strongly suspect that over the long run much better. Also, more democratic governance structures can greatly lessen the hold that special interest groups have over all big areas of our system, from science to industry to finance to you name it. But this all just personal opinion and don't pretend to know that I'm right. I really do enjoy your writing; have a great Sunday night.
—Mike
My take on history is as an evolutionary process. I look at how different kinds of data change over time. When I find a change, then I look into the narrative history of what was happening then to see if I can find some reason for the change.
A different approach is to focus on the narrative history of what happened when and where. Your focus on participation has given rise to your concept of the Old Republic.
For me unless these things are associated with changes in the data series that I use to track historical evolution I find it hard to see a significant role they played.
You and Mike both have great points here, but let's look at an example here which is highly illustrative of how data can hint at 2nd and 3rd order effects, linking the invisible cultural effects with data-driven causes.
I'm sure you're aware that back in 2000s a threshold was reached where employment from large companies in the private sector began to exceed that of the SME sector. This was a disastrous development for one simple reason- people who work for larger employers, be they government or private, tend to be fundamentally less happy and fulfilled, although in individual cases this won't always be the case. To put in context, a 2018 survey of the UK SME sector showed that just shy of 80% of employees stating that they were either 'very' or 'extremely' happy with their employment and workplace. Compare this to government or corporations and I doubt one could find a third of employees who are somewhat happy with their employment.
There are plenty of reasons why this happens. A gardener may get paid exactly the same as an Amazon worker, once he's paid for his utility vehicle, petrol and insurance, but he gets a huge amount more satisfaction from his work, and usually gets thanked on a regular basis from customers grateful for his hard work (apart from the snobs who won't make him a cup of tea or coffee). Another reason is the intercession of HR bureaucracies between bosses and employees, impeding the normal reciprocal relationships between worker and management.
I'm pretty sure your employment was somewhat different. Specialists tend to get a better deal through KETA management, more prone to receiving kisses than kicks. I had the same deal with Anglian- access to director level decision makers, and the chance to present my ideas for innovation and change. But most workers at large companies don't fall into these categories. They lead depressing work lives which allow them little input, or feelings of autonomy- some responsibility, but very little in the way of authority to make changes or act on their own initiative.
And, of course, this shows up in other data as 2nd and 3rd order effects. I'm sure you're aware of Angus Deaton's highly relevant work 'Deaths of Despair and the Future of Capitalism'. I am not claiming that the shift from small to large employers is the only factor, but it is a major factor, probably only eclipsed by the critical effects of a drop out of labour participation, which is the tail end of the curve to the broader phenomenon of workplace disenfranchisement.
And the addition of DEI bureaucracies on top of HR has only made the situation worse. In one survey conducted for the Free Speech Union by Dynata, it was found that 31% of people had left a former employer because of the uncomfortable workplaces created by DEI training and bureaucracy. If you happened to be Black or LGBT in the UK at the time the survey was taken, the figure rose to a whopping 43%, begging the question who exactly is this essentially political bureaucracy supposed to serve?
My point would be this- sometimes cause and effect are obvious in the data. Sometimes the effects only show up with time, particularly when a more extreme version of an existing cause makes an appearance- like the difference between HR departments and their worse counterpart, DEI.
Overall, the shift from small to big is societally disastrous.
And that is fair enough!. Tracking changes in data series to to get a grip on historical evolution is a valid way to approach the questions. But this approach *MAY* have some inherent limitations, especially when dealing with large long-term paradigm shifts that typically always take time to fully manifest themselves in data sets.
One problems here is lag time in historical data to reflect the changes in realities. For example, large scale and inherent political and/or economic changes, like those seen in the transition from the Old Republic's decentralized governance to today's more centralized system, might not show immediate effects in the series. There might be a sort of "phase space" (colloquial def of the term) where data lags or for some period of time just fails to capture the immediate impacts of the paradigm shift. Also, the choice of data series itself could skew your perceptions if it's not tracking closely with the variables most affected by the changes.
Connecting data changes to narrative history is important. But maybe it shoulf take into consideration that some effects, especially those related to structural and systemic changes like large and deep shifts in political governance or economic policy frameworks, typically manifest only over long periods of time. These effects might have a lot nuanced and require a wider array of data or longer time horizons to be fully appreciated.
Something things, like the emergence of private sector central planning in the economy, which fully began to emerge in the late 1970s as the private sector components of that began to have their public sector counterparts dissolved and then absorbed their functions, can be difficult to see in headline data. But their effects on everything from real incomes to size and quality of output across scientific fields are (I beleieve) quite real. And this problem has gotten worse over time and, I assume, so have its effects. Here's a great book from all the way back in 1985 that identified the problem that had already emerged: "The Transformation of American Capitalism: From Competitive Market Structures to Centralized Private Sector Planning" by John R. Munkirs
At least that my point of view, for whatever thats worth.
I hope your having a great start to the week!
---Mike